Objections to Humanism

Conversation 19, Socrates Worldview 14/22

And my soul said, ‘Let us pass on. He is the realist, who turns his back on the whole he cannot grasp, and busies himself with a fragment.’ – from The Greater Sea by Kahlil Gibran.

‘There is no God in heaven, there is no hell below, so says the great professor of all there is to know, but I've had the invitation that a sinner can't refuse, it was acid, it was tragic, it was almost like the blues’ – from Almost Like the Blues by Leonard Cohen.

When his companions had joined him and their coffees had arrived, Socrates took from the pocket of his cycling jersey a folded sheet of paper on which was printed some text. He then said:

SOCRATES. Good morning, friends. If you will allow me, I would like to read you this delightful little excerpt from Professor Grayling’s book (Grayling 2013, Ch. 12).

ALL. Go ahead, Socrates.

S. Remember that today we are looking at the arguments for humanism to see whether we find them convincing. Grayling extols the virtues of secularism and then he offers us this melodious paragraph: ‘In a truly secular world, one where religion has withered to the relative insignificance of astrology, tarot card divination, health-promotion based on crystals and magnets, and other marginal superstition-involving outlooks, an ethical outlook which can serve everyone everywhere, and can bring the world together into a single moral community, will at last be possible. That outlook is humanism.’

ADEIMANTUS. The humanists are great optimists, it seems.

CRITOBULUS. The melody I hear is that of John Lennon’s song ‘Imagine’ – ‘Imagine there’s no heaven. It’s easy if you try ….’ The dreaminess of the tune seems appropriate.

EUTHYDEMUS. Appropriate for the puerile philosophy of the lyrics!

S. Atheists are fond of accusing people who feel a desire to believe in God with the sin of wishful thinking. I will argue that Grayling’s little dream is wishful thinking in its purest form. But firstly, let me remind you of Grayling’s argument against religion and for humanism. It goes like this: (1) It is irrational to believe in God; (2) We must be rational; (3) So, we must seek the ethical life; (4) And this leads us, using our reason, to propose our own rules for society. This process, Grayling supposes, will bring about the humanist nirvana of that little paragraph of his I quoted.

C. Tell him he’s dreaming!

S. I would like to tell him so, Critobulus, but we must examine the nature of his dream a little more closely. In a nutshell, I would summarise the problem as follows: reasoning about ethics has about as much chance of bringing the world ‘together into a single moral community’ as dialectical materialism had of bringing about the communist dream of a truly classless society. The reason is that both humanism and communism have a woefully inadequate understanding of human nature.

E. No doubt you will argue that the major religions are much more informed and realistic about human nature.

S. Indeed I will, Euthydemus, but first let us talk about ethics. If you will allow me to quote again from Grayling, he says this (Grayling 2013, Ch. 13): ‘In essence, humanism is the ethical outlook that says each individual is responsible for choosing his or her values and goals and working towards the latter in the light of the former, and is equally responsible for living considerately towards others, with a special view to establishing good relationships at the heart of life, because all good lives are premised on such.’

A. You wouldn’t quibble with that, would you Socrates?

S. I would not, Adeimantus, although I was leading up to pointing out the danger that lurks in the words, ‘choosing his or her values’. However, my point in giving you the quote was to highlight the close relationship that, according to Grayling, exists between humanism and ethics.

A. I predict that you will shortly tell us how your old school dictionary defines ethics.

S. Correct as usual, Adeimantus. It defines ethics as ‘Science of morals; moral principles’ (The Little Oxford Dictionary of Current English 1962).

A. Impressively succinct.

S. The Little Macquarie gives us a little more help with this definition (Blair 1993): ‘A system of moral principles, by which human actions and proposals may be judged good or bad or right or wrong.’

A. So, ethics is about the study of moral principles?

S. Close enough, Adeimantus, although Grayling’s main ethical concern is to define what is meant by the good life, which I suppose means a life filled with good things rather than bad things.

C. Well then, how does Grayling characterise the good life?

S. He sums it up in two pithy paragraphs which I might as well quote verbatim (Grayling 2013, Ch. 14). He lists the characteristics of the good life as follows: ‘One is that good lives seem meaningful or purposeful to the people living them. Another is that they are lives lived in relationships, having at their core real intimacy — love, or friendship — with one or more others. A third is that they are lives of activity of doing, making or learning. A fourth is that they are consistently marked by honesty and authenticity. A fifth is that they manifest autonomy, that is, the acceptance of responsibility for the choices that shape the course of life. A sixth is that the felt quality of the life from an aesthetic point of view is positive; that is, the experience of living it feels rich or satisfying to the person living it. The seventh and last is integrity, in the sense of the integration of all the others into a whole which constitutes the individual's own chosen project for the good.’

E. How could anyone object to that?

S. I don’t object to any of it, Euthydemus. The problem is that Grayling is at pains in his book to argue that religion gets in the way of the good life, or that at best religion is unnecessary to a good life. I am not going to argue that religion is essential to a good life, but I argue that religion is compatible with Grayling’s vision of the good life.

E. The evidence that religion is compatible with the good life is out there for all to see, Socrates. I myself know many religious people whose lives are just like that.

S. I believe you do, Euthydemus, but I have not fully satisfied myself that you and your fellow ‘born again Christians’, as you describe yourselves, do not occasionally seek to impose your views on others. That’s something I will come back to another time.¹ For now, we must look at Grayling’s humanist ethical principles, where he gets them from, and their application to practical moral questions.

C. Will one cup of coffee be enough to get us through all that?

S. For your sake I will try to be brief, Critobulus. Grayling (Grayling 2013, Ch. 18) proposes two principles that he insists must be applied in reasoning about the ethical complexities facing society: ‘responsibility’ and what he calls the Harm Principle. By ‘responsibility’ he means ‘one's ethics is one's own responsibility’ (Grayling 2013, Ch. 16). His Harm Principle means ‘our freedom to choose and act must not result in harm to others’ (Grayling 2013, Ch. 17).

C. That seems reasonable.

S. Yes, but ….

E. I would object to everyone choosing their own definition of what is good.

S. So would I, Euthydemus, but you are jumping ahead of me. Remember that the humanists criticise religious believers for being irrational, and I have conceded that there are elements of irrationality in religious belief. Grayling has said that the basic principles from which we begin our ethical reasoning must be supported by evidence, otherwise it is irrational to believe them. Now where is the evidence that we must be responsible for our choices and must aim to do no harm to others? These principles are certainly nice, but they are not necessary, in the sense of being supported by irrefutable evidence. There is no shortage of evidence that many people do not live by these principles.

A. Grayling shoots himself in the foot when he speaks of ethical choices. If his ethical reasoning was based on solid evidence and proceeded by logic, there would be no rational way of making choices about the conclusions.

S. My point exactly, Adeimantus! Grayling’s principles are nothing but preferences, and preferences are not rational. So, the humanists are hoisted on their own petard. They are, in the end, no more rational than many religious believers. Let me give you a couple of examples of ethical reasoning put forward by Grayling: abortion and euthanasia (Grayling 2013, Ch. 19). Grayling’s reasoning leads him to be in favour of both. Many people would agree with his conclusions, but many, especially outside of our decaying Western society, do not. How can this be?

C. I imagine you will shortly tell us, Socrates.

S. It goes back to your preferences for the basic principles. If you start by positing, as Grayling does, that a woman’s perception of her future well-being is more important than the life of her child, then naturally you can conclude that abortion is acceptable. But not everyone agrees that one life can be more important than another. In fact, I could use Grayling’s Harm Principle to argue against himself. In Chapter 21 of his book he says, ‘moral ideas have their life in the relationships between human beings in social settings. It is in the conversation, negotiation and mutuality of social life that moral norms and practices actually emerge; and when in addition to moral debate each individual has a mature concern for the ethical - the personal choices and aims that take responsibility to others deeply into account - circumstances exist in which a good society has the best chance of emerging.’ Actually, I would argue, as I did in our previous discussion, that what Grayling has just said is a good description of the human process by which the Christian concept of God has arisen. Now, taking ‘responsibility to others deeply into account’, no-one can argue that abortion and euthanasia do not affect anyone but the protagonist, so it is a matter of preference as to which persons you want to favour.

C. But surely a foetus is not a person, Socrates.

S. It depends on what you mean by ‘person’, Critobulus. You can’t deny that a foetus will become a living human in the normal course of events and, what’s more, one or more people who know of the pregnancy will already have formed a concept of the person the foetus could become, along the lines I discussed in our earlier conversation.² In that sense, the foetus is already a person. But what I want to know now is, do you all accept that humanist ethical reasoning is based on preference and so is irrational at its roots?

A. I am afraid we must accept that, Socrates.

S. Very good. But be not afraid Adeimantus.

C. It looks to me like they choose their starting principles so that they get the conclusions they want.

S. Cruel but fair, Critobulus. I am glad you said it and saved me from having to appear harsh. Now, let’s move on to some other objections to humanism. I maintain that humanism is a religion for comfortable professors. They have a weak grasp of human nature, like Marxists, who are forever wondering why the socialist revolution has never caught on. They are hopelessly optimistic about human nature while at the same time looking down on most people as dupes; they fail to see that the human soul contains both good and evil. They expect too much of human reasoning and would deprive those who are not ‘learned and wise’ of their comfort, and they can be cruel in their judgement of their opponents.

A. Where are you going to start, Socrates?

S. The points I’m making are heavily interwoven but let me begin with the hopeless optimism of the humanists, which leads them to the vision of utopia I quoted at the beginning or our discussion today. Humanists maintain that most people are fundamentally good; they must be, or they would have to admit that their utopia is impossible. They imagine that rationality leads to goodness.

A. You don’t agree with these propositions, Socrates?

S. For people who like their beliefs to be strongly based on evidence, Adeimantus, the humanists seem strangely blind to the realities of human nature. Anyone who makes an honest appraisal of humanity knows that most people may be good some of the time, but all the evidence of history indicates that most people can be good sometimes and bad at other times. One only needs to look at examples of mob action, witch hunts and lynchings, to understand that normal people can be guilty of the most terrible evil. When it comes to rationality, psychopaths and tyrants are usually coldly rational in their reasoning. They just prefer to begin with the principle that what is best for themselves is good, and any means to achieve their ends are acceptable. There is plenty of evidence that humans do not act rationally much of the time. How else can you explain the widespread acceptance of ridiculous conspiracy theories?

C. We are not all psychopaths and tyrants, Socrates.

S. No, but most of us succumb to the temptations of comfort or power, at least some of the time, and more of us than you might like to admit can be selfish bullies rather more than occasionally. The Judeo-Christianity tradition deals head-on with these frailties of humanity. Vast experience over millennia has taught us much about sin and forgiveness that humanists wilfully discard. You hear much talk from humanists about tolerance, but never about forgiveness, whereas the concept is absolutely central to Christianity.

A. You said a minute ago, Socrates, that humanism is a religion for comfortable professors. What did you mean by that?

S. Humanism has been criticised as being Christianity with God taken out. I wouldn’t put it that way; I would describe humanism as a watered-down religion with God replaced by the self and the challenging, but essential, elements of sin, atonement, and forgiveness taken out. Humanists would be shocked by my assertion that they put themselves in place of God, and yet they take for themselves the authority, indeed the obligation, to define what is good and evil. There are none so blind as those who will not see! They sweep aside the insight of Abraham, absolutely fundamental to Judeo-Christianity, that the woes of humanity stem from usurping the right to decide what is good and what is bad. But who was Abraham? Just an ‘illiterate herdsman’, not one of the ‘wise and learned’. Do you see why I say that the thing that most galls me about humanists is their conceit?

A. What do you attribute their conceit to, Socrates?

S. You have heard the joke, no doubt Adeimantus, about the ideal employee?

A. You may have to remind me of it, Socrates.

S. The best employee is a fifteen-year-old. You should get them to work while they still know everything! Have you noticed that professors are overrepresented among the leading exponents of humanism? Professors are people who know a lot, but in my experience they can be quite adolescent in their behaviour. Like the archetypal adolescent, the one thing they don’t know is what they don’t know. Let me give you an example. The noted atheist, I think it is fair to call him a humanist, Christopher Hitchens once described, in the one sentence, Lady Diana as a ‘simpering Bambi narcissist’ and Mother Teresa as ‘a thieving, fanatical Albanian dwarf’ (Holznagel 2011). As always, there may be some hint of truth behind these remarks, but surely, they are adolescent in their crassness.

A. A cry for attention, perhaps?

S. Yes, a very adolescent characteristic. That remark was in the context of a criticism of the public adoration of Lady Diana and Mother Teresa at the time of their deaths, but you can’t help feeling that recourse to such immoderate invective is a smoke screen for a lack of intellectual depth.

C. Great compassion for humanity, but hatred of individual people.

S. You said it, Critobulus.

E. Hitchens was not a professor.

S. Quite so, Euthydemus, but I think it is fair to say he numbered himself among the intellectuals and, therefore, on a par with professors. He certainly numbered himself among ‘the Four Horsemen of the Counter-Apocalypse’ along with Sam Harris, who has a PhD in cognitive neuroscience, and professors Richard Dawkins and Daniel Dennett (Pallardy 2023).

C. He kept bad company, then.

S. You could say that, Critobulus.

A. I suppose it put Grayling’s nose out of joint to be overlooked for membership the Horsemen of the Counter-Apocalypse.

S. I couldn’t say whether Grayling felt that way, but if he did, he was magnanimous enough to include Hitchens along with Harris, Dawkins, and Dennett in his reading list for the study of humanism (Grayling 2013, Ch. 13). But coming back to comfortable professors, it was that shining light of humanists, John Locke (Locke 1690), who said words to the effect that ‘all-knowing Doctors,’ not the uneducated, cause society’s troubles, and that the ‘Candle of the Lord set up by himself in men's minds’ shines bright enough to lead everyone to the knowledge of the existence of a God. I am inclined to agree with Locke on that point.

E. What are you saying, Socrates?

S. I am saying that uneducated folk are quite capable of appreciating the fundamentals of Christianity: that there is a just and merciful God who loves them; that it is natural to feel guilt if you do wrong; that sin requires atonement; that forgiveness is available to anyone who repents; and that we must forgive the wrongs of others. Uneducated people can understand that these few simple ideas are the essence of humanity. Of course, there are more complex processes in human affairs that need greater learning to be understood, but greater learning can often get in the way of common sense. The common folk are quick to smell a rat when some ‘all-knowing Doctor’ attempts to sell them some proposition that would erode their democratic rights, because the common folk are convinced that before God and the law, all people are equal, and they are as good as anyone else.

A. Are you going to talk about politics now, Socrates?

S. We will save politics and society for another day, Adeimantus. Right now, I am focussing on the attitude of the humanist apologists who number themselves among the ‘learned and wise’. There is a dangerously undemocratic current to some of their utterances. Let me give you some examples. You all know about Hillary Clinton’s description of supporters of her political opponent as a ‘basket of deplorables’. Richard Dawkins (Dawkins 2016) published an article titled ‘Ignoramuses should have no say on our EU membership—and that includes me’ in which he stated that the ‘Brexit’ question was too complicated for ordinary people to decide and that it should be left to experts. His inclusion of himself among the ‘ignoramuses’ was disingenuous because, although he admits to not being an expert on international affairs, he did consider himself expert enough to lecture people about who should be allowed to decide who has a part in running their country.

A. Perhaps he would be happier if we were governed by philosopher kings.

S. As long as he was one of the kings, Adeimantus. Our friend Grayling too has doubts about whether ordinary people are smart enough to participate in democracy. He says (Grayling 2013, Ch. 15), ‘With very few exceptions, private individuals are in no position to make a difference to these problems. It is nations and their governments that have to do it, but they are all hamstrung by the short-termism and localism of the democratic process. It is not the fault of that process so much as the poor quality of candidates and electorates, who vote their own personal interest before almost all other considerations; so politicians are nailed to the petty hamster wheel of the electoral cycle.’ So, according to Grayling, we are members of a poor-quality electorate.

C. Don’t you sometimes feel that the electorate makes bad choices, Socrates?

S. Indeed I do, Critobulus, but I also have no doubt that government by a cabal of experts and elites is highly likely to be far worse. Let me give one more example. Grayling speaks favourably of the pronouncement of human rights by the United Nations. I agree with him to the extent that codifying human rights has been a positive development, but there is a negative effect when governments give these rights a legal context. It means that the power of interpreting these rights in a legal way is handed to another set of unelected elites, namely the courts. It is another case of government by philosopher kings, the ‘learned and wise’.

C. Are you not a comfortable professor yourself, Socrates?

S. I am not and never have been a professor, Critobulus, and as I once said to Adeimantus, I am comfortable enough to be able to spend part of my day sitting here drinking coffee with you gentlemen who, I may say, look pretty comfortable as well. Humanism, I think, only works for people with comfortable lives, like tenured university professors. People who are subject to the buffetings and vicissitudes of reality need something much stronger and enduring, tested by human experience over millennia. I am fortunate not to have been buffeted too strongly, but I have rubbed shoulders many times with people who have felt the vicissitudes and have been forced to cry out, ‘God help me!’ It makes me angry to think that the humanist answer to such a cry of distress is, ‘There is no God. You need to think rationally about your situation.’ Not everyone has the time or resources to become learned, nor the ability to analyse a situation rationally, and even if they did it would not necessarily bring them comfort. Yet they are all capable of understanding the comfort religion can bring. The humanists are cruel to deprive people of that comfort.

A. And they say religion is cruel for offering false hope.

S. I think they misunderstand the nature of hope. It’s an attitude that brings comfort and resilience against further hardship. Perhaps you have seen the painting ‘The Angelus’ by Jean-François Millet? It depicts a peasant couple in the fields digging potatoes. The light suggests it is either sunrise or sunset – they have a long day. From the distant church steeple, they hear the bells of the Angelus and they bow their heads in prayer. No doubt they are praying that their ‘daily bread’ will be sufficient. They are not learned, though they may be wise. Their hope in God sustains them though the day in a way that philosophical discourse cannot do.

E. It is one of my favourite paintings.

S. Mine too. The artist understood what it is like to live life at the subsistence level. He has empathy for them, he does not, as a humanist would, exhort them to examine their lives. The artist does not denigrate the peasant for submitting to a system. I will quote again what Grayling said about this (Grayling 2013, Ch. 14): ‘When people submit to systems, they are handing over to them (to those who devised them) the right to do their thinking and choosing for them.’ These people, he would say, are giving up their freedom because they are not living authentically and exercising autonomy. Autonomy, he says, is ‘the responsibility, ultimate and fundamental, for one's choices’, while ‘To live inauthentically is to be enslaved, at least in part, to the falsity of the person one thus is.’ (Grayling 2013, Ch. 14). To me, that passage moves from being insensitive to being cruel. What is more, I imagine that Millet’s peasants would be surprised to learn that they were not being true to themselves or taking responsibility for their choices, so far as they were able to.

E. Most of the Christians I know would not consider that they hand over their thinking to a system.

S. And as I said yesterday, all Catholics I associate with would laugh at the suggestion that they are not autonomous or authentic. They are all mature people, and nobody makes them go to mass. It is their free choice. When you examine a system of thought and find that you agree with its basic precepts and most of the conclusions those precepts lead to, you quite reasonably find yourself comfortable with adopting it as a set of guiding principles. Most Catholics, I find, are flexible enough to overlook a few of the dogmas that they conclude have outlived their historical origins in very different cultural settings. They are wise enough not to throw the baby out with the bathwater!

A. Wasn’t it your famous ancestor who said, ‘The unexamined life is not worth living’, Socrates? How does that sit with submitting to a system?

S. My illustrious ancestor was indeed reported to have said that, Adeimantus, although I think he was saying his life would not be worth living if he were exiled from Athens and not able to practice his usual philosophical work of examining life. But you are wrong to think that most Catholics ‘submit’ to a system. In my experience, they freely adopt the system, which is not the same as submitting. What’s more, I know of no group of people who examine their consciences more regularly than Christians. Are you aware of the work of W. K. Clifford?

A. I can’t say I’ve heard of him.

S. You should regard yourself as fortunate in that respect, Adeimantus. Grayling quotes this Clifford with great approval when he writes (Grayling 2013, Ch. 6): ‘The last word on these matters surely belongs to W. K. Clifford, writing on the “ethics of belief”: “It is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence. If a man, holding a belief which he was taught in childhood or persuaded of afterwards, keeps down and pushes away any doubts which arise about it in his mind, purposely avoids the reading of books and the company of men that call into question or discuss it, and regards as impious those questions which cannot easily be asked without disturbing it — the life of that man is one long sin against mankind.”’ What do you think of that?

A. I think his criticism of wilful ignorance is justified, but the condemnation is excessive to the point of cruelty. A person might be 'guilty' of pushing away doubts, but also live the life of a saint in the service of others. As usual, the humanist misses the mark. A person might do all the things that Clifford wants them too and still believe in God.

C. Clifford sounds like a nasty piece of work. I wouldn’t invite him to dinner.

S. I am glad you can see that, Critobulus, you have come a long way. But our discussion has become a little sombre. Shall I tell you a funny story? We were talking earlier how humanists are just as irrational as anyone in their preferences for their precepts. Grayling, again displaying his wishful thinking, asserts: ‘These considerations arise from the resources of human experience and reflection alone, and they are completely persuasive. It can legitimately be hoped that anyone who reflects on them will agree’ (Grayling 2013, Ch. 14). Such is the power of hope, but my story shows that humanists, or at least nominal humanists, can disagree, and more than that, they can be cruel to each other.

C. Please get on with the story, Socrates!

S. This story is about Professor Richard Dawkins.

E. You mentioned him before, Socrates, but who is this Richard Dawkins?

S. Richard Dawkins is a professor of evolutionary biology – I don’t criticize him for that – who is also a very public militant atheist. He is known for attacking, with all the clarity of mind of one who does not appreciate the subtlety of the human heart, or see another person’s point of view, anyone who professes a religious belief. For example, he has attacked Christian nuns for teaching religion to children. Here is another example of his work: in his book ‘The God Delusion’, published in 2006, he wrote that the god of the Old Testament is ‘a vindictive, bloodthirsty ethnic cleanser’ and ‘a misogynistic, homophobic, racist, infanticidal, genocidal … capriciously malevolent bully.’

A. Not noted for moderation in language, I see.

S. Or for reading the bible with attention and understanding. Anyway, as a result of demonstrating such wisdom and learning, in 1996 Dawkins was given the Humanist of the Year Award by the American Humanist Association for his ‘communication of scientific concepts to the public’, which the Association considers to be ‘an important aspect of advancing the cause of humanism’. So far so good, but in 2021 Dawkins blotted his humanist copy book. He had observed that an apparently white person was being vilified for identifying as black, whereas the same accusers were happy to accept that a man or woman could identify as being of the opposite gender. His point was that it is no less rational (in Grayling’s sense of being supported by evidence) for a person of mixed race to identify as belonging to one component of their racial heritage than it is for a person of one sex to identify as being of the opposite gender.

A. What did the Humanists think was wrong with that?

S. In their announcement withdrawing the award (American Humanist Association 2021), they said that Dawkins had ‘accumulated a history of making statements that use the guise of scientific discourse to demean marginalized groups, an approach antithetical to humanist values’. It has been reported that Professor Dawkins was upset at the loss of his award.

C. Anyone can see that the humanists are crazy!

S. Well, we can at least see that they don’t always behave rationally because, surely, one can make a rational argument that a person who chooses to identify as the opposite gender to their birth sex is not literally of that sex.

E. Obviously.

S. I think that what upset Professor Dawkins was not the loss of the award, but the realisation that these paragons of rationality, the American Humanist Association, where no more rational than the next man. Human nature is not what he supposed it to be.

A. How tragic!

S. Yes, poor Dawkins was busy being rational and failed to notice that the rules had changed.

A. Do you think the American Humanist Association might have been infiltrated by postmodernists, or cynics as you call them.

S. Quite possibly, but this would mean that the genuine humanists had neglected to keep a watch on the gate of their sheepfold. I think it more likely that they individually were seduced by the shifting tide of postmodernist sentiment. They failed to submit those sentiments to the cold glare of rationality.

A. They wouldn’t be the only ones to make that mistake.

S. The lessons I want us to take from this story are these: firstly that the precepts or principles on which humanists base their morality, or ethics – call it what you like - are quite arbitrary and subject to change without notice – they are no more rational than the precepts of many religions; secondly that it is very difficult for most people to be rational all the time, they are easily seduced by emotions and the influence of others.

C. Dawkins got off lightly, perhaps.

S. Yes, the cynics in our Western society presently are content with ‘cancelling,’ or having people forced out of their jobs, which is serious enough. Grayling maintains that ‘Secularists do not aim to burn religious apologists at the stake. They use arguments.’ (Grayling 2013, Ch. 12). He evidently does not include some of the murderous autocrats currently at large in the world under his definition of ‘secularist’, even though many of them are anti-religion. He would say they are ideologues, not true secularists. I would answer that they use ideologies as a cover and that they are only really interested in themselves. In truth, they are cynics. I am not so optimistic as to assume that our home-grown cynics will not progress to murdering their opponents. I heard a story about the Bishop of Chicago who, not long ago, said that he expected to die in bed; that his successor would die in prison; and that his successor’s successor would die in the public square.

A. A gloomy outlook, to be sure.

S. We must do our best to combat this cynicism. My main complaint against humanism is that rationalism as a way of life is untenable. It’s too difficult for most people to sustain. Psychological experiments have shown that most people are unable to offer rational explanations for their beliefs (Cook 2017). Faced with having to ‘nut out’ a host of complex issues, most people revert to the stirrings of the heart, be they good or evil, or they absorb the ideas of their peer group. For goodness’ sake, as the Dawkins story shows, even the American Humanist Association is unable to sustain rational impartiality and allowed themselves to slip into the cynics’ camp! Humanism is a slippery slope between religion and cynicism, or between a rock and a hard place, if you like. Religion is a rock the people can cling to with confidence, while cynicism has all the subtle attractions that evil has to offer. They are both stable places, but humanism is not. But enough! Have we persuaded you, Critobulus? Are you going to finally put postmodernism behind you for good and throw your lot in with the humanists?

C. Maybe not after your criticism of humanism. Have you got anything better to offer?

S. You could consider Christianity, which we will talk about tomorrow.

References

American Humanist Association. 2021. American Humanist Association Board Statement Withdrawing Honor from Richard Dawkins. 19 April. Accessed June 15, 2023. https://americanhumanist.org/news/american-humanist-association-board-statement-withdrawing-honor-from-richard-dawkins.

Blair, David, ed. 1993. The Little Macquarie Dictionary. Macquarie University, NSW: The Macquarie Library.

Cook, Gareth. 2017. “You Do Not Think Alone.” Scientific American. 20 June. Accessed June 30, 2017. https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/you-do-not-think-alone.

Dawkins, Richard. 2016. “Ignoramuses should have no say on our EU membership—and that includes me.” Prospect, 9 June. Accessed September 17, 2023. https://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/opinions/42919/richard-dawkins-ignoramuses-should-have-no-say-on-our-eu-membershipand-that-includes-me.

Grayling, A. C. 2013. The God Argument: The Case against Religion and for Humanism. Bloomsbury.

Holznagel, Fritz. 2011. “Did Christopher Hitchens Really Call Mother Teresa a “Thieving, Fanatical Albanian Dwarf”?” Who2 Biographies. 16 December. Accessed September 11, 2017. https://www.who2.com/did-christopher-hitchens-really-call-mother-teresa-a-thieving-fanatical-albanian-dwarf.

Locke, John. 1690. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. https://www.lancaster.ac.uk/users/philosophy/courses/211/Locke%27s%20Essay.htm.

Pallardy, R. 2023. “Christopher Hitchens.” Encyclopedia Britannica. 5 September. Accessed October 3, 2023. https://www.britannica.com/biography/Christopher-Hitchens.

1962. The Little Oxford Dictionary of Current English. Third. Oxford: Oxford Clarendon Press.

1. See the conversation on Defence of Christianity.

2. See the conversation on The Person.